If you are wondering on what basis Lord Hutton absolved Tony Blair and Alasdair Campbell of Andrew Gilligan’s charge that they had “sexed-up” the WMD intelligence dossier, the answer is the same old story: Hutton misrepresented the charge that Gilligan had made, found the defendants innocent of that charge, found Gilligan guilty of make a false charge, and ignored the charge Gilligan actually had made! And a fair reading of the evidence presented in Hutton’s report and of Hutton’s conclusions shows that the charge Gilligan actually made was correct.
Here is conclusion 8, paragraph 228, chapter 6 of the Hutton Report:
“The term "sexed-up" is a slang expression, the meaning of which lacks clarity in the context of the discussion of the dossier. It is capable of two different meanings. It could mean that the dossier was embellished with items of intelligence known or believed to be false or unreliable to make the case against Saddam Hussein stronger, or it could mean that whilst the intelligence contained in the dossier was believed to be reliable, the dossier was drafted in such a way as to make the case against Saddam Hussein as strong as the intelligence contained in it permitted. If the term is used in this latter sense, then because of the drafting suggestions made by 10 Downing Street for the purpose of making a strong case against Saddam Hussein, it could be said that the Government "sexed-up" the dossier. However in the context of the broadcasts in which the "sexing-up" allegation was reported and having regard to the other allegations reported in those broadcasts I consider that the allegation was unfounded as it would have been understood by those who heard the broadcasts to mean that the dossier had been embellished with intelligence known or believed to be false or unreliable, which was not the case.”
I beg to differ with the Lord. Anyone who has lived in the U.K. during the Blair years will tell you that when the phrase “sexed-up” is used in relation to the activities of Alasdair Campbell, it is not used in the sense of “falsify”, but in the sense of “spin.” Until Campbell was forced to resign over the Kelly affair, it had been widely understood for years that his role in the Blair government that of Spin Doctor in Chief -- Karl Rove and Dan Bartlett rolled into one. In this role, Campbell did not falsify, he added, subtracted and multiplied (exaggerated) the raw materials in order to produce a final product which had the desired effect on public opinion. No-one who heard Andrew Gilligan’s charge that Campbell had “sexed-up” the dossier would have understood it to mean an allegation of falsification. It was clearly an allegation of spinning.
A reading of the evidence summarized in Chapter 6 of Hutton’s report makes it clear that Campbell did in fact do precisely this. Engaging in a bit of spin himself, Hutton concludes that in suggesting that the dossier drafters might wish to transform statements qualified by a degree of doubt or uncertainty into firm statements of fact, Campbell was merely trying to assure that the dossier presented the strongest possible case against Saddam.
Hutton will respond that Campbell was careful not to push the intelligence civil servants into places where they would not go. And there is evidence in the record that at least one of Campbell’s suggestions was rejected for this reason. But this is merely an exception that proves the rule: Campbell had put himself in charge of the entire process of preparing the dossier, and he saw to it that the drafters in the intelligence civil service were asked not, “what do you think,” but rather, “you know the conclusion we want, make the strongest case you can.”
Here is Campbell’s memo to the John Scarlett, whom he had appointed to be in charge of the drafting exercise:
“At our discussion this morning, we agreed it would be helpful if I set out for colleagues the process by which the Iraq dossier will be produced.
The first point is that this must be, and be seen to be, the work of you and your team, and that its credibility depends fundamentally upon that.
· why the issue arose in the first place
· why the inspection process was necessary
· the history of concealment and deception
· the story of inspectors, leading to their departure
· the story of weapons unaccounted for, and what they could do
· a section on ballistic missile technology
· CW/BW
· nuclear
· the sanctions regime, and how the policy of containment has worked only up to a point
· illicit money
· the repressive nature of the regime
· why the history of the man and the regime (Iraq/Iran; chemical weapons on his own people; Kuwait; human rights) makes us worried he cannot be allowed further to develop these weapons.”
It is remarkable that Campbell can write, “this must be the work of you and your team,” and follow this (point 7) by dictating the conclusion the dossier should reach on the fundamental question, which was whether the policy of containment was working This little memo is the work of a consummate spin-master, who understood that his internal memos might eventually appear as evidence in an inquiry. The second paragraph coats the message in sugar -- with references to the independence of the drafters and the credibility of the report -- and the conclusion to be reached is slipped into what otherwise appears to a list of section headers. Vintage Campbell.
Between September 5 and September 20 when the final draft of the dossier was put to bed, Campbell met regularly with Scarlett. Campbell apparently only put his drafting comments into writing once, but it has hard to imagine that he didn’t discuss language with Scarlett throughout the drafting period. Eventually, Campbell was satisfied with the wording in the dossier itself. To this he added his own spin-spit-polish in the form of a foreward, and the product was ready for public consumption. That product now made the best possible case for regime change by military action, and that case was now a lot sexier than it would have been if Campbell had not directed the preparation of the dossier. QED.
